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on the White Paper by the Directorate-General for Compe-
tition of April 2008 on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules* 
 
The Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law is a 
research institute within the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Arts and 
Science. The Max Planck Institute undertakes research on fundamental questions 
of law in these areas. The Institute regularly advises governmental bodies and other 
organizations on the national and international level. It has an international ap-
proach and places emphasis on the comparative analysis of law as well as eco-
nomic and technological aspects of legal developments. 
The Institute provided comments on the 2005 Green Paper on Damages Actions for 
the Breach of EC Antitrust Rules1. This paper comments on the 2008 White Paper. 
 
                                                 
* Authors of the comments are Josef Drexl, Beatriz Conde Gallego, Stefan Enchelmaier, Mark-
Oliver Mackenrodt and Rupprecht Podszun. The comments are also supported by Reto M. Hilty. 
1 (2006) 37 IIC 700. 
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1. Preliminary considerations 
The Institute welcomes the continuation of the Commission’s endeavours to work 
on more uniform rules concerning private damage claims for the infringement of 
Community antitrust rules (Articles 81 and 82 EC). 
Before going into more detail, some general considerations need to be recalled: 
1.1.  The impact on national civil law 
The Commission wishes to facilitate the private enforcement of competition law 
rules. The judgments in the cases of Courage2 and Manfredi3 have shown at a 
Community level that private damage actions are possible and can be potentially 
successful. In Germany, the ‘Zementkartellverfahren’ seems to prove that major 
damage claims can be handled by the courts.4 
However, the Commission proposes to challenge some well-established principles 
of national civil liability laws. This might be seen as a risk as well as a chance for 
the development of national civil liability systems and the European integration of 
civil law. Although the Commission has not yet proven beyond doubt that such a 
bold approach is necessary, traditional ideas of awarding damages might be shat-
tered and replaced by sectoral rules of civil liability. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Case C-453/99 Courage [2001] ECR I-6297. 
3 Joined Cases C-295 to 298/04 Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619. 
4 On 14 May 2008 the Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht) Düsseldorf – Case VI-U (Kart) 14/07 – 
held admissible the law suit of a Company incorporated in Belgium that had acquired the damage 
claims of 36 purchasers of cement against six members of a cement cartel which operated in Ger-
many between 1993 and 2002. The claim amounts to almost €113 million. See http://www.olg-
duesseldorf.nrw.de/presse/material/entscheid/2008-05-14_urt_%20zementkart.pdf (accessed on 15 
July 2008). 
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1.2.  The Need for further clarification on the relationship of public and pri-
vate enforcement 
European countries traditionally prefer to rely on public enforcement rather than 
private enforcement. The advantage of this approach is that the public interest is 
served in the first place. The disadvantage of this approach is that individual con-
sumer interests and the need for compensation of individual damages may be dis-
regarded.  
Public enforcement and private enforcement therefore reflect the discussion on the 
aims of competition policy – is it a tool to protect the competitive process and to 
serve the public good or is it primarily an instrument of consumer protection? 
Of course, it has to be decided whether the private enforcement of competition law 
rules should serve as a compensating tool only. If private enforcement is primarily 
seen as an annex or a supplement to public enforcement, the thrust will be to facili-
tate follow-on actions and to limit claims to strict compensation. If, however, pri-
vate enforcement was to be seen as a tool to contribute to the enforcement of com-
petition law rules in the public interest,5 one would have to promote the deterrent 
effect of private enforcement even beyond mere compensation. 
1.3.  The need to integrate private enforcement in a comprehensive system 
of enforcement 
It is vital to take into account how minor amendments might affect the whole sys-
tem of competition law enforcement. The enforcement package as a whole needs to 
strike a balance: Competition law rules should neither deter undertakings from ex-
ercising competitive spirit, nor should they leave too much space for anticompeti-
tive behaviour. This is a delicate balance. 
                                                 
5 Such a concept was pointed out by the ECJ in Courage, supra note 2, para. 26, by indicating that 
the full effectiveness of EC competition law would be put at risk it it were not open to any individual 
to claim damages. 
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Importing rules from other competition law systems, e.g. the United States, does 
not work if they are not placed into this context.  
This systematic approach also raises the question whether private enforcement 
should have the same relevance as public enforcement and the question of who 
should the ‘private enforcer’ be. The motivation for private claimants – who some-
times seek shelter from competition rather than promote competition – argues for 
specific safeguards that are not necessary for public enforcement. 
1.4.  The need to differentiate between different forms of infringement 
Finally, the discussion should take into account different forms of infringements. 
Sometimes, the discussion seems to focus on hardcore cartels only. However, pri-
vate damage actions are also possible in other cases of Art. 81 and 82 EC.6 In other 
cases than hard-core cartels, liability is not often as easily discernible for the 
wrongdoer. Therefore, it might be of value to distinguish such cases in particular 
with regard to the requirement of fault. 
 
2. Comments on more specific issues 
2.1.  Standing: indirect purchasers and collective redress 
Recommendation: The results of the general studies should be carefully examined 
to devise a system that avoids conflicts with the legal systems of Member States 
and with general principles of the law. The Commission should bear in mind that 
collective redress bodies will considerably affect the existing enforcement land-
scape.  
                                                 
6 On civil liability for violation of Art. 82 EC see contributions in Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Beatriz 
Conde Gallego & Stefan Enchelmaier (eds), Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation - New 
Enforcement Mechanisms?, Berlin etc. (Springer) 2008. 
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The Institute welcomes the performance of general studies on consumer collective 
redress in the Member States. In view of the results of these studies it should be 
carefully examined whether effective mechanisms of collective redress should be 
introduced in the field of competition law. Carrying out a general study first allows 
for the design of a collective redress system for competition law that optimally fits 
into the existing legal orders and traditions of the Member States and that mini-
mizes the emergence of purely sector-specific rules of civil procedure.  
It should be kept in mind that the collective character of consumer actions magni-
fies the effect of the general mechanisms that are implemented to alleviate private 
enforcement and may in certain areas of competition law raise concerns of an over-
deterrence. The emergence of collective redress bodies will affect the balance be-
tween public and private enforcement. At one extreme side of possible scenarios 
they might assume the role of a second public enforcer while being to a lesser de-
gree subject to public interest considerations and to public control. In this case pub-
lic authorities would be weakened in their role of shaping competition policy. 
The latter concern is especially relevant with regard to representative actions, in 
particular if they do not act in the name of identifiable victims as members and if 
the compensation collected would not be distributed to the victims7. As to opt-in 
actions, the possibility of continuous opt-in by additional plaintiffs should be ex-
cluded to avoid delaying proceedings and unduly burden swift administration of 
justice to the disadvantage of the initial plaintiffs. Opt-in actions may be less likely 
to be abused by self-interested initiators than opt-out actions. This, however, does 
not mean that self-interested opt-in actions are completely excluded. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Such latter possibility is not excluded by the Commission, see the Commission Staff Working 
Paper of 2 April 2008, SEC(2008) 404, para. 56. 
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2.2.  Access to evidence: inter partes disclosure 
Recommendation: The Institute welcomes the Commission’s approach, but rec-
ommends introducing some stricter rules to avoid the abuse of confidential infor-
mation. 
Regarding the disclosure of documents, the White Paper proposes to grant the 
courts the authority to order disclosure of documents subject to specific conditions, 
in particular ‘fact pleading’. The White Paper also recommends granting special 
protection to corporate statements by leniency applicants and to the work of com-
petition authorities. Finally, it endorses deterrent sanctions when evidence is de-
stroyed or withheld. 
The Institute, in line with its comments to the Green Paper, welcomes the strict 
adherence to fact pleading and judicial control as far as the disclosure of docu-
ments is concerned. The discretion left to the courts is still considerable. Some fur-
ther guidance would be desirable. In particular, the White Paper does not explicitly 
refer to the dangers of abuse of such instruments and the necessity to protect confi-
dential business information. This represents a disparity with respect to the dangers 
for leniency programmes and the work of competition authorities since these dan-
gers are explicitly mentioned. This point should be clarified and further restrictions 
might be inserted to avoid ‘fishing expeditions’. Anything coming close to ena-
bling private claimants to blackmail an undertaking into payments simply to avoid 
a lengthy disclosure procedure has to be avoided. An explicit protection of infor-
mation concerning third parties and an explicit restriction regarding the use of the 
information provided might be helpful. 
2.3.  Binding effect of decisions adopted by competition authorities 
Recommendation: The Institute welcomes the Commission’s approach of making 
final decisions of national competition authorities binding on national courts. It 
would, however, advise the Commission to clarify that the probative effects of a 
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national competition authority decision would be limited not only to the material 
and personal scope, but also to the territorial scope of the decision.  
The White Paper proposes that when national courts in actions for damages rule on 
agreements, decisions or practices under Art. 81 or 82 EC which are already the 
subject of a final decision by a national competition authority within the European 
Competition Network finding an infringement of these provisions, or are the sub-
ject of a final ruling by a review court upholding the national competition authority 
decision or itself finding an infringement, they cannot make decisions against such 
a decision or ruling. 
In its comments on the Green Paper, the Institute recommended to make infringe-
ment decisions by competition authorities of the EU Member States binding on 
civil courts with a distinction between decisions that have been subject to judicial 
review and those that have not. It consequently welcomes the now proposed policy 
option in the White Paper. A binding effect of NCA’s final decisions on civil 
courts would enhance the effectiveness of private enforcement of EC competition 
law by allowing a rational division of labour and allocation of resources between 
courts and specialised agencies while at the same time giving consideration to the 
principle of protection of defendants’ rights.  
The Institute also endorses the Commission’s proposal as it does not draw any dis-
tinction of the effects of NCA decisions based on their origin. As the Commission 
rightly points out, the probative effects of a NCA decision would be confined to the 
scope of the decision. This limitation would, however, not only cover the material 
(same agreement, decisions or practices) and personal (same infringers) scope – as 
the Commission explicitly states –, but also the territorial scope of the decision. 
Thus, a decision of a NCA finding an infringement of Art. 81 or 82 EC can only 
refer to those anticompetitive effects that took place within the jurisdiction of that 
NCA. Accordingly, a decision of a foreign NCA would have no binding effect on a 
national court with respect of the anticompetitive effects (and therefore also with 
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respect of the damages) of an agreement or practice in the jurisdiction of that na-
tional court (or of another NCA).8 Since this is a fundamental aspect, the Institute 
would advise the Commission to also make this point clear.  
The binding effect of final decisions of NCAs of other Member States is therefore 
limited to such cases in which domestic courts also adjudicate damages incurred in 
such foreign territories,9 be it a matter of the domestic private law of the competent 
court10 or of the law of such other States11. 
Even if the binding effect of NCA decisions on national courts is limited in the 
abovementioned way, the measure proposed by the Commission would still pro-
mote the private enforcement of EC competition rules. Hence, it would relieve a 
national court from the difficult task of having to make investigations abroad in 
order to establish the existence and scope of an infringement (abroad). The pro-
posed measure thus remains effective also in the case contemplated by the Com-
mission that a claimant decides to concentrate proceedings against multiple defen-
dants in a single national court.12 Moreover, in those (common) cases where an 
agreement or practice has anticompetitive effects in more than one Member State, 
the claimant would normally have the possibility to rely on the binding effect deci-
sions of several NCAs or even on a Commission decision.13 
                                                 
8 The text of Art. 5 of Regulation 1/2003 is not quite clear with regard to the territorial scope. How-
ever, the Commission itself in its Proposal for the Regulation of 27 September 2000, COM(2000) 
582 final, p. 17 clearly commented on this provision that ‘[d]ecisions adopted by national 
competition authorities do not have legal effects outside the territory of their Member State’. 
9 According to Art. 2(1) Brussels Regulation 2001/44 an alleged infringer can be sued for the whole 
harm caused in the EU before the courts of his domicile. 
10 If the defendant is sued before a court of the Member State where he is domiciled, this court at 
request of the plaintiff will apply its own law with regard to claims concerning EU-wide harm 
caused by a violation of Art. 81 or 82 EC according to and under the conditions set out in Art. 
6(3)(b) Rome II Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations.  
11 According to Art. 6(3)(a) Rome II Regulation the competent court has to apply the law of the 
Member State where the market is affected. This leads to the need to assess EU-wide damages ac-
cording to the law of a multitude of domestic laws unless the single law of the forum state according 
to Art. 6(3)(b) may be applied. 
12 See Commission Staff Working Paper (supra n. 6), para. 161. 
13 In this sense the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authori-
ties, paras 5 et seq, in particular paras 12 and 14. 
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2.4.  Fault requirement 
Recommendation: The Institute endorses the Commission’s approach but would 
leave it to the courts to further interpret the defence relating to excusable error. 
The White Paper proposes to hold the infringer liable unless he demonstrates that 
the infringement was the result of an excusable error. This is, basically, the ap-
proach the Institute recommended in its comments on the Green Paper. The Insti-
tute endorses the Commission’s approach not to prescribe strict liability rules with-
out a fault requirement. This would actually run counter to established fundamental 
principles of European civil law and would require a particularly fine justification. 
It might be preferable to leave open the more detailed questions of excuses. This 
would leave to the respective jurisdictions to define what excuses might be ac-
cepted by the defendant. Practically, only the ‘hard cases’ such as complicated 
cases of infringements of Art. 81 EC mostly in the field of vertical agreements and 
particularly of Art. 82 EC will prove problematic with respect to the fault require-
ment. Providing too strict of a standard would cut off the possibility to establish the 
infringement in a first step and to correct it in a second one by using the ‘fault re-
quirement’. In doing so, the courts can ensure a certain dynamic in the application 
and definition of the norms, and they also have a final resort to excuse behaviour in 
difficult cases. 
2.5.  Damages 
Recommendation: It is recommended to award the higher amount of actual loss or 
the surplus reaped if the action of private plaintiffs has not been preceded by an 
enforcement action of a public authority to ensure the skimming off of illegal prof-
its in a single procedure and to strengthen private enforcement. 
Regarding the scope of damages, the White Paper suggests a codification of the 
acquis communautaire to serve as a minimum standard. The staff working paper 
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favours the compensation principle over the deterrence principle by limiting dam-
age awards to single damages which reflect actual loss, lost profits or interest pay-
ments. At the same time, it is acknowledged that according to the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice exemplary or punitive damages would not be con-
trary to the European public order and that Member States would be free to take 
steps to prevent an unjust rewarding of victims.  
In its comments on the Green Paper, the Institute advocated a rule under which the 
defendant would be entitled to the higher amount of either the damage caused or 
the surplus reaped by the infringer if the private action of the claimant has not been 
preceded by an enforcement action of a public authority.  
In cases where the public authority comes first to pursue an enforcement action, the 
public authority usually skims off the illegal gains. If, by contrast, it is a private 
plaintiff who is the first to institute proceedings against an infringer, it is the pri-
vate plaintiff who is acting as an agent in the public interest without being able to 
profit from enforcement efforts of a public authority. The private plaintiff replaces 
the public authority and bears the procedural risks and burdens of the enforcement 
action. In this scenario a higher damage award does not necessarily constitute an 
unjust enrichment for the plaintiff and leaving the skimming off of the illegal prof-
its to the public authority would constitute a windfall profit for the authority and 
lower the incentive for private claimants to go after competition law infringements 
in cases other than follow-on actions. Even if the White Paper regards private en-
forcement as complementary and not as a replacement for public enforcement this 
does not warrant an inefficient duplication of proceedings in one and the same case 
by having a private party litigate the case and leave it to a public authority to skim 
off the illegal profits in a second identical proceeding.  
The defendant cannot legitimately expect to retain his illegal profits. If the in-
fringer were allowed to keep such profits or if he could count on the fact that in the 
case of private enforcement the public authority later may or may not skim off the 
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illegal profits, competition law infringements might still prove profitable for the 
defendant and the enforcement action would not yield a deterring effect.  
If a doubling of damage awards is envisaged, this should primarily be limited to 
certain hard-core offences. In these cases there is little concern for an over-
deterrence as compared to other areas of competition law. 
As regards the quantum of damages, in its comments on the Green Paper, the Insti-
tute has already welcomed the adoption of guidelines that allow for the application 
of simplified rules of estimation. It would be desirable if such guidelines would 
also cover offences under Article 82 EC. In this field damage calculation is particu-
lar complex and only rarely discussed.  
2.6.  The Passing-on of overcharges 
Recommendation: The Institute recommends excluding the passing-on defence, 
creating a presumption in favour of indirect purchaser plaintiffs and implementing 
a separate mechanism for dividing the overcharge between purchasers from differ-
ent levels of the distribution chain.  
The White Paper favours admitting the passing-on defence and points out that 
anyway the burden would be upon the defendant to prove that the plaintiff has 
passed-on the overcharge. For the scenario where the infringer is sued by an indi-
rect purchaser the White Paper proposes a rebuttable presumption that the damage 
has been passed on in its entirety down to the plaintiff. 
The Institute in its comments on the Green Paper, by contrast, advocated an exclu-
sion of the passing-on defence and the institution of a legal mechanism for distrib-
uting the damage award between the first plaintiff and other victims.  
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In general, admitting the passing-on defence privileges the infringer without good 
cause.  
To start with, the White Paper is inaccurate in arguing that the plaintiff has not 
suffered any loss if he has managed to pass on the price increase to a lower level of 
the distribution chain. In fact, the plaintiff has suffered a loss at the time when he 
had to pay too much for the merchandise he received. Passing-on the overcharge 
regularly may require particular negotiation or advertising efforts on the part of the 
plaintiff. There is no reason to allow the infringer to profit from the special efforts 
of the defendant. In such a scenario, it would not be the defendant who is unjustly 
rewarded but the infringer.  
The Staff Working Paper is misleading in footnote 109 by citing § 33(3)(2) of the 
German GWB as being in support of its position of admitting the passing on de-
fence. On the contrary, German law, although not excluding the passing-on de-
fence as such, will in most cases not support such a defence as a matter of general 
principles of civil liability. § 33(3)(2) GWB states that the ‘damage shall not be 
excluded on account of the resale of the good’ (emphasis added). Accordingly, the 
provision seeks to clarify that the resale of a good – at whatever price – does not by 
itself make the claim unfounded. Under German law, the claim of the first pur-
chaser as such comes into existence with the conclusion of the first sale contract 
that charges excessive prices. Then, the question remains whether the infringer 
should be allowed to argue for a subsequent reduction of the damage in order to 
prevent the first purchaser from reaping profits after the resale of the good at high 
prices. In most cases this question will be answered in the negative because it 
would inequitably privilege the infringer and therefore be contrary to the principles 
of the law of damages. In addition, an affirmative answer would compromise the 
principle of deterrence. The same principles apply in other areas of law: for exam-
ple a defendant who has injured the plaintiff is not released from his liability sim-
ply because a relative of the plaintiff has paid for his medical treatment. There is 
no reason to deviate from this solution in competition cases. In sum, § 33(3)(2) 
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GWB cannot be invoked to support the Commission’s position of admitting the 
passing-on defence. Rather, the provision will usually lead to the opposite result, 
namely a denial of the passing-on defence.  
From a policy perspective admitting the passing-on defence suffers from several 
significant drawbacks:  
The Staff Working Paper points out that the defendant must prove that the plaintiff 
has passed on the overcharge. This, however, does not offer much help for the 
plaintiff in competition cases because it already follows general principles of law 
that the defendant carries the burden of proof for facts that justify a defence. How-
ever, the current state of the laws which in some jurisdictions admits the passing-
on defence has – as the Commission documents presuppose – proven insufficient 
for having an effective private enforcement.  
Also, the presumption in favour of indirect purchaser plaintiffs does not make it 
more likely that the infringer is deprived of its illegal gains. Difficulties in proving 
that the damage has been passed on down to a particular level is only one out of 
several reasons why indirect purchaser suits are only rarely successful. For exam-
ple, indirect purchasers will often not be able to ascertain in retrospect how much 
of a particular product they have consumed during the time of the infringement. 
Even if collective actions by indirect purchasers might reduce certain hurdles for 
indirect purchaser suits like the fragmentation of the damages, there is no reason 
why in a particular case the infringer should be privileged vis-à-vis the direct pur-
chaser plaintiff by being granted the passing-on defence.  
Consequently the infringer is likely to keep the illegal gains and, thus, to be un-
justly rewarded.  
Further, the solution favoured by the White Paper does not solve the problem that 
the infringer might have to compensate the illegal overcharge more than once. If a 
non liquet scenario occurs in both proceedings, the infringer must pay damages to 
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the direct purchaser because the infringer is not able to prove that a passing-on has 
occurred and at the same time the infringer owes damages to the indirect purchaser 
because the infringer could not rebut the presumption that a passing-on has oc-
curred down to the level of the indirect purchaser.  
As regards proving the passing-on of the overcharge, indirect purchasers on the one 
hand and direct purchasers on the other hand find themselves in conflicting posi-
tions. While it is in the interest of direct purchasers to prove that no passing-on has 
occurred, it is in the interest of indirect purchasers to prove that passing-on has 
taken place. In the solution favoured by the White Paper the infringer might profit 
from this conflict and end up keeping the illegal gains.  
In addition, in order to be in a position to sue the original infringer, the indirect 
purchaser is often dependant on information by the direct purchaser. Admitting the 
passing-on defence, however, invites a silent vertical coordination between the 
infringer and the direct purchaser. If the direct purchaser has managed to pass on 
the overcharge, he from the outset will not have any valid claim in a system that 
allows the passing-on defence. He will therefore be more interested in maintaining 
a workable relationship with his supplier and not cooperate with indirect purchas-
ers. The indirect purchasers will remain nearly defenceless against such silent co-
ordination between the infringer and the direct purchaser. He will not have any 
legal claim against the direct purchaser, if there is no competition law offence on 
the part of the direct purchaser.  
For these reasons the Institute recommends a model in which the passing-on de-
fence is excluded and the indirect purchaser plaintiff is allowed to rely on the re-
buttable presumption that the illegal overcharge was passed on down to his level.  
Whoever is first to successfully sue the infringer would be awarded the whole 
overcharge but – in a separate procedure – be obliged to share the overcharge with 
purchasers from other levels of the distribution chain. Simultaneously, the defen-
dant should be accorded a defence according to which he can no longer be held 
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liable to another purchaser in the distribution chain to the extent that the damages 
claimed do not exceed the amount paid or accorded to another upstream or down-
stream purchaser. This model assures that the infringer can only be held liable 
once, and, by maintaining the incentive of all purchasers at all levels of distribution 
to sue for damages, it would be less likely that the infringer ends up keeping the 
overcharge. The distribution of the compensation between purchasers at different 
levels would have to be decided in a separate procedure without participation of the 
infringer as a party. Here, the law should ensure that later purchasers have a right 
to claim the overcharge to the extent that a passing-on has actually taken place. A 
rebuttable presumption in favour of the passing-on seems appropriate also in this 
situation.14 Direct purchasers may still have strong incentives to sue their suppliers 
for competition law infringement since downstream customers may have little in-
terest in suing for their individual loss that decreases in the distribution chain and 
because indirect purchasers may still face difficulties to prove the amount of sales 
from individual suppliers.  
2.7.  Limitation periods 
Recommendation: The adoption of a uniform limitation period in line with the one 
foreseen in Article 25(1)(b) Reg. 1/2003 could be considered. A suspension of the 
limitation period should be provided in those cases where administrative proceed-
ings were initiated but they did not end in a decision finding an infringement. 
The Institute agrees with the Commission that the rules governing the limitation 
period should be such to allow for an effective private enforcement of EC competi-
tion rules. It also supports the Commission’s proposal that the general principle 
concerning the commencement date of the limitation period – i.e. the date on which 
the infringement is committed – be adjusted to the special features of damages ac-
                                                 
14  For more details cf. Josef Drexl, “Zur Schadensberechtigung unmittelbarer und mittelbarer Ab-
nehmer im europäisierten Kartelldeliktsrecht”, in: Andreas Heldrich et al. (eds.), Festschrift für 
Claus-Wilhelm Canaris zum 70. Geburtstag, Vol. 1, Munich (C.H.Beck) 2007, p. 1339, 1356-9.  
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tions and, in particular, to the circumstance that the victim should reasonably be 
expected to have knowledge of the infringement before the limitation period starts 
to run. Although for the time being the Commission does not render necessary to 
suggest a (minimum) duration of the limitation period for stand-alone cases, a simi-
lar rule to the one provided for in Art. 25(1)(b) of Regulation 1/2003 could be con-
sidered. Accordingly, the action for damages would be time-barred after five years. 
A uniform limitation period would definitely increase legal certainty while reduc-
ing the risk of forum shopping. 
As to follow-on claims, the Institute fully endorses the solution proposed by the 
Commission in the White Paper. It notes, however, that the White Paper does not 
contemplate the case in which a competition authority – after having commenced 
administrative proceedings – did not find an infringement or the reviewing court 
did not uphold the infringement decision of the competition authority. Despite the 
absence of an infringement decision, the victim may still be willing to bring a dam-
ages action before a national court (which would not be bound by the negative de-
cision of the competition authority). In these cases, national law should provide for 
a suspension of the limitation period for the time administrative proceedings or 
proceedings before a reviewing court are lasting. 
2.8.  Costs of damages actions 
Recommendation: The Institute supports the Commission’s decision in the White 
Paper not to suggest any specific changes on the national cost regimes. 
In its comments to the Green Paper, the Institute pleaded to leave it up to the na-
tional courts to grant cost rebates. In this respect, the Institute supports the Com-
mission’s decision in the White Paper not to suggest any specific changes in the 
national cost regimes. 
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2.9.  Interaction between leniency programmes and actions for damages 
Recommendation: In the Institute’s view, the Commission’s approach raises some 
concerns. The Institute questions the approach of limiting the civil liability of leni-
ency  applicants. 
The conflict of protecting leniency programmes on the one hand, and ensuring a 
fair compensation of the victims of competition law violations, on the other hand, 
needs to be balanced. The protection of leniency is vital and is also in the interest 
of private applicants who wish to bring damage actions. Their follow-on actions 
will profit from the decisions of competition authorities based on leniency applica-
tions. Yet, the victims of competition law infringements do not participate in the 
process of granting leniency. Moreover, the value of leniency programmes has 
come into doubt: Some argue that the success of leniency programmes shifts the 
focus of the authorities’ resources. Time and personnel invested in cases detected 
through leniency applications are not available for the detection of other, poten-
tially more harmful cartels. If this proves true, a core quality of public enforcement 
– the ability to rely on sovereign powers would be misguided. 
In the White Paper, the Commission proposes not to disclose corporate statements 
by leniency applicants. It also suggests discussing further limitations to the civil 
liability of immunity recipients. 
The protection of the leniency programmes envisaged by the Commission meets 
some concerns. Firstly, it is unclear in how far the protection of corporate state-
ments is compatible with what has to appear in the findings of a competition au-
thority, once it has issued a decision. It is also questionable whether the far-
reaching protection of any leniency applicant is justified. Distinctions might be 
drawn between leading undertakings and others, and the decision whether an appli-
cation is accepted or not, and whether the application qualifies for a rebate of fines 
or not. If there is no such distinction, leniency applications might serve as a simple 
shield to further disclosure. 
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In the view of the Institute, it would be overly generous to limit the civil liability of 
immunity recipients. The general idea of leniency is to grant a reduction in fines to 
someone who helps to discover the infringement. This issue has to be distinguished 
from the compensation issue. Linking the two would amount to a contract at the 
expense of third parties (the victims) between the authority and the wrongdoer. A 
full compensation is thus necessary.  
The applicant’s contribution to discover the infringement might result in the avail-
ability of documents that help to prove civil liability of the leniency applicant to the 
infringement. Yet, this should not make him more vulnerable than his co-infringers. 
Therefore the White Paper argues in favour of some strict rules controlling disclo-
sure of such documents. The Institute endorses this approach, and it does not see the 
need to go any further than this. 
 
 
 
